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must also be addressed, see [50, Chapter 
18], for example.
The above key-agreement protocol can 
easily be extended to a public-key encryp-
tion scheme, in which Alice can send a 
message m to Bob over an insecure chan-
nel, without having first agreed on a se-
cret key with him [14]. In particular, Bob 
chooses a key-pair ( , )b gb  consisting of 
a private key b, which is kept secret, and 
a public key gb, which is published. To en-
crypt a message { , , }m p1 1f! -  to Bob, 
Alice chooses a random { , , }a p1 1f! -  
and sends to him ( , ) ( , ( ) )c c g m ga b a1 2 = . Bob 
decrypts by computing /m c cb2 1= , using 
his private key b. One can also obtain a 
digital signature scheme in a similar man-
ner [14] and there are a large number of 
variations and cryptosystems with more 
complex properties, all of which rely on the 
hardness of the DLP in one form or anoth-
er. Hence, having groups in which the DLP 
is hard is essential.
Pairing-based cryptography
An interesting family of protocols which are 
pertinent to this story are those which arose 
from the invention of pairing-based cryp-
tography in 2000, allowing cryptographic 
functionalities such as identity-based non- 
interactive key distribution [47], one-round 
tripartite key-agreement [25] and identity- 
based encryption [8] (and later several 
hundred others). All of these rely on the 
existence of certain non-degenerate effi-
ciently computable bilinear maps, known 
as pairings. Such a map has the form
: ,e G G G1 2 3"#
where G1 and G2 are abelian groups of 
exponent l N! , which by convention are 
written in additive notation with identity 
pute the shared key as Bob does). Hence, 
it is also necessary that the problem of 
recovering a from ( , )g ga  — known as the 
discrete logarithm problem (DLP), since it 
is the inverse of exponentiation — is hard 
to solve too. Note that finite cyclic groups 
other than Fp
# may also be used to instan-
tiate this protocol. We therefore formalise 
the DLP more generally with the following.
Definition 1. Given a finite cyclic group ( , )G $ , 
a generator g G!  and another group el-
ement h G! , the DLP is the problem of 
finding an integer t such that h gt= . The 
integer t — denoted by log hg  — is uniquely 
determined modulo the group order and 
is called the discrete logarithm of h with 
respect to the base g.
Although the DHP is clearly reducible to 
the DLP, in the sense that an algorithm to 
solve the latter provides an algorithm to 
solve the former, it is not known whether 
the converse holds in general; there are 
however several positive results in this 
direction [7, 39, 40]. Since there are no 
known algorithms which solve the DHP di-
rectly, research on the hardness of the DHP 
has focused almost entirely on the hard-
ness of the DLP, which explains its cryp-
tographic importance. We note that while 
necessary, the hardness of the DHP is by 
no means sufficient to ensure the security 
of the protocol, since several other issues 
By way of motivation, we begin with the 
landmark work of Diffie and Hellman, who 
in 1976 introduced the following very well 
known key-agreement protocol, which al-
lows two parties — referred to as Alice and 
Bob — to agree a shared secret key over an 
insecure channel which can then be used 
for secure communications between them 
[13]. To do so, Alice and Bob agree in ad-
vance on two public system parameters: 
p a prime integer and g a primitive root 
modulo p. We denote by Fp the finite field 
of p elements, represented as usual as the 
quotient Z/pZ with coset representatives 
always in { , , }p0 1f - ; g thus generates 
the multiplicative group Fp
#. To establish 
a shared key, Alice picks a secret integer 
{ , , }a p1 1f! - , computes ga and sends 
this to Bob. Likewise, Bob picks a secret 
integer { , , }b p1 1f! - , computes gb and 
sends this to Alice. Using their respective 
secrets Alice and Bob can both compute 
the shared key
( ) ( ) .g g gab b a a b= =
In order for this key to be secure, it is nec-
essary that it is hard to compute gab from 
the public information ( , , )g g ga b , for some 
notion of ‘hard’ that is discussed later on. 
The task of doing so is known as the Diffie– 
Hellman problem (DHP). One way to solve 
the DHP is to recover a from ( , )g ga  and then 
compute the shared key as Alice does (or 
equivalently recover b from ( , )g gb  and com-
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is exponential in the size of the problem, 
namely logN, we see that in the ideal case 
from a cryptography perspective, the DLP 
is exponentially hard. Of course, the DLP 
can be no harder than exponential since a 
naive enumeration of powers of the gen-
erator will solve it too. Note that a square 
root complexity can be achieved using a 
standard time-space trade-off known as 
Baby Step / Giant Step, or a memory effi-
cient version based on random walks, due 
to Pollard [46]. Further note that if the 
prime factorisation of N is known then 
the DLP can always be reduced to a set of 
DLPs in prime order subgroups, by project-
ing into them via exponentiation by their 
cofactors, using a form of Hensel lifting for 
prime-power order subgroups, and apply-
ing the Chinese remainder theorem [45]. 
So in practice the DLP can be assumed to 
be in a group of prime order. These re-
sults imply that in order to solve the DLP 
in a time faster than exponential, one must 
exploit representational properties of ele-
ments of the group. In some scenarios this 
is possible, as for multiplicative groups of 
finite fields for example, while in others 
it is apparently not, as for the group of 
Fp-rational points on a suitably chosen 
elliptic curve. The latter explains the pop-
ularity of elliptic curve cryptography, first 
proposed in 1985 independently by Mill-
er [42] and Koblitz [33], which essential-
ly achieves optimal security per bit as a 
result.
In general, the hardness of a DLP is 
measured by the complexity of the fastest 
algorithm known to solve it. The following 
function is often used in this regard:
( , )
,exp log log log
L c
c o N N1
N
1
a
= + a a-_^ ] ^ ^gh h h i
where [ , ]0 1!a , c 0> , log denotes the 
natural logarithm and the ( )o 1  denotes a 
function that tends to zero as N " 3. Ob-
serve that ( , ) ( )logL c N0 ( )N
c o 1= + , which 
thus represents algorithms which run in 
polynomial time, while ( , )L c N1 ( )N
c o 1= +  
represents algorithms which run in expo-
nential time. For 0 1< <a , the function 
( , )L cN a  represents algorithms which are 
said to run in subexponential time. As is 
customary we often omit the subscript N 
and the constant c when convenient.
The first subexponential algorithm for 
the finite field DLP was shown by Adleman 
in 1979 to have heuristic complexity ( / )L 1 2  
[1], see the next section. It is termed heu-
pairing itself is efficiently computable, but 
large enough that the DLP in Fqn
# is hard. 
Therefore, while as with the key-agree-
ment protocol each pairing-based protocol 
comes with a set of problems other than 
the DLP which must be hard in order for it 
to be secure, all are vulnerable to develop-
ments in discrete logarithm algorithms for 
the finite field DLP.
Hardness of the DLP
Let ( , )G $  be a finite cyclic group of known 
order N in which the group operation is as-
sumed to be computable in unit time, and 
let g be a generator of G. First observe that 
exponentiation in G can be performed in 
time polynomial in the bitlength of N, i.e., 
log N2^ h, since one can take the binary ex-
pansion of an exponent e and compute ge 
via the square-and-multiply algorithm or its 
variants. Hence, for a group G to be useful 
for discrete logarithm-based cryptography, 
discrete logarithms should not be comput-
able in polynomial time, and should prefer-
ably be much harder to compute.
Note that there are groups in which the 
DLP is easy. For instance, if ( / , )G NZ Z= +  
and g N1 1# # -  is coprime to N, then g 
is a generator and ‘exponentiation by e’ 
is just ( )modeg N . Thus the discrete loga-
rithm of any element h is just ( )modhg N1- . 
As all cyclic groups of order N are isomor-
phic to ( / , )NZ Z + , one might expect the 
DLP in such groups to be easy. However, 
since computing the image of such an 
isomorphism requires solving a DLP with 
respect to a generator, this need not be 
so. Indeed, the representation of group 
elements may obscure the cyclic structure 
to varying degrees, which dictates the ap-
parent hardness of the DLP in each group.
If one insists upon not exploiting any 
information regarding the representation 
of group elements, i.e., the worst case 
from a cryptanalytic perspective, then the 
DLP in such groups can be analysed us-
ing the generic group model. This model 
stipulates that group elements are repre-
sented using random encodings, while the 
group operation is performed using an or-
acle which takes as input the encodings 
of two elements and outputs the encoding 
of the group operation applied to the in-
put elements. In this case it can be shown 
that the DLP requires ( )NX  oracle calls 
in order to be solved with high probability, 
i.e., at least c N  for some constant c 0> , 
for N sufficiently large [43, 49]. Since this 
element 0, and G3 is a cyclic group of or-
der l, written in multiplicative notation with 
identity element 1.
The non-degeneracy condition is that 
for all \{ }P G 01!  there is a Q G2!  such 
that ( , )e P Q 1! , and for all \{ }Q G 02!  
there is a P G1!  such that ( , )e P Q 1! . 
The bilinearity condition is that for all 
, 'P P G1!  and all , 'Q Q G2!  one has 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
' '
' '
e P P Q e P Q e P Q
e P Q Q e P Q e P Q
+ =
+ =
which implies that for all P G1! , all Q G2!  
and all ,a b Z!  one has 
( , ) ( , ) .e aP bQ e P Q ab= (1)
Although such maps arise naturally from 
the Tate and Weil pairings on arbitrary abe-
lian varieties over local or finite fields, for 
efficiency purposes they are usually in-
stantiated using elliptic curves over finite 
fields. In this case, for the Tate pairing [16] 
we have ( ) [ ]G E lFq1 = , the group of l-tor-
sion points on an elliptic curve E defined 
over Fq, with q p
r=  and l coprime to p. G3
is the group nl of l-th roots of unity in Fq, 
which embeds into Fqn
# , with n the order of 
q modulo l, also known as the embedding 
degree. Finally, G2 is the quotient group 
( ) [ ]/ ( ) [ ]E l lE lF Fq qn n , whose coset represen-
tatives we do not describe here. For the 
definition of the pairing itself and other 
technical conditions we refer the interest-
ed reader to [5, Chapter 9], which contains 
a comprehensive introduction to the area.
The property (1) was originally exploit-
ed using the linearity of the pairing in the 
first argument only, in order to transfer a 
DLP from an elliptic curve group to a DLP 
in an extension of the underlying base 
field [41]. Indeed, if the input DLP in G1 is 
( , )P aP , one selects an appropriate Q G2!  
such that ( , )e P Q 1!  — which exists by the 
non-degeneracy condition — and computes 
( , )g e P Q=  and ( , )g e aP Qa = . The raison 
d’être of this transfer is that in general 
the best algorithms for solving the finite 
field DLP have lower complexity than the 
best algorithms for solving the elliptic 
curve DLP, so even though the inputs to 
each problem have different sizes, namely 
logn q2  and log q2 , if the embedding degree 
is small enough then the transferred DLP 
will be easier to solve.
However, it is the full bilinearity that 
enables interesting cryptographic applica-
tions. Such applications require that the 
embedding degree is small enough that the 
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can be computed as follows. Testing ran-
dom e, we quickly find that
,
modhg p13 11
720 2 3 5
e 53
4 2
$
$ $
=
= =
and hence
(
)
.
log log log
log mod p
13 4 2 2 3
5 53 1
357
11 11 11
11
= +
+ - -
=
A basic question arising from this approach 
is how large should the factor base be 
in order to optimise the running time, as 
p " 3? This depends on the density of 
smooth numbers, whose definition we now 
recall. 
Definition 2. A positive integer is said to 
be B-smooth if all of its prime divisors are 
at most B.
The following result on the asymptot-
ic density of smooth numbers amongst 
the integers is due to Canfield, ErdŐs and 
Pomerance [9].
Theorem 1. A uniformly random integer in 
, ,M1 f" , is B-smooth with probability
where, ,P u u( ( )) log
logu o
B
M1 1= =- +
provided that ( )u3 1 loglog
log
M
M
# # f-  for 
some 0>f .
Clearly, the larger the factor base then 
the higher the probability that a uniformly 
random element of Fp
#, viewed as an in-
teger, is smooth with respect to the factor 
base. However, one then requires more re-
lations. On the other hand, a smaller fac-
tor base means fewer relations are need-
ed, but each is harder to find. Theorem 1 
indicates how to optimise this trade-off; 
in particular, using the very aptly defined 
function ( , )L cN a  it implies the following.
Corollary 1. Let ( , )M L 2N a n=  and B = 
( , )LN a b . Then the expected number of 
trials until a uniformly random number in 
{ , , }M1 f  is B-smooth is ,LN a b
ana k.
For the Fp
# index calculus algorithm 
we have ( , )M N L 1 1= = . Corollary 1 im-
plies that we should set the smoothness 
bound to be ( / , )B L 1 2 b=  for some un-
known 0>b . Since we need about | |F . 
/ logB B B#  relations, the estimated run-
ning time is
generated, obtain these logarithms by 
solving the corresponding linear sys-
tem.
3. Individual logarithms: Find an expres-
sion for h as a product of factor base 
elements, for example by computing hge 
for random e until this factors complete-
ly over F , from which one can easily 
deduce log hg .
The elements of F  are usually chosen 
to be the set of ‘prime’ elements whose 
‘norm’ is less than some bound (for some 
notions of prime and norm), since such a 
choice generates the maximum number of 
elements of G amongst all sets of the same 
cardinality. How steps (1) and (3) are per-
formed in practice depends very much on 
the group in question and the ingenuity 
of the cryptanalyst. In order to illustrate 
the method we now present a very simple 
example.
Example. Let p 1009= . Then g 11=  is a 
generator of G Fp=
#. Let { , , , }2 3 5 7F = . 
Relations are obtained by computing 
modg pe  for random { , , }e p1 1f! -  and 
then using trial division to check wheth-
er this integer is a product of the primes 
in F . The following relations were quickly 
obtained:
,
,
,
.
mod
mod
mod
mod
p
p
p
p
11 15 3 5
11 315 3 5 7
11 63 3 7
11 10 2 5
796
678 2
992 2
572
$
$ $
$
$
= =
= =
= =
= =
Note that the factorisations occur in the 
parent ring Z of /pF Z Zp , . These rela-
tions yield the following equations mod 
p 1- :
,
,
,
.
log log
log log log
log log
log log
796 3 5
678 2 3 5 7
992 2 3 7
572 2 5
11 11
11 11 11
11 11
11 11
/
/
/
/
+
+ +
+
+
Writing this linear system in matrix form 
we have:
.
log
log
log
log
796
678
992
572
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
2
3
5
7
11
11
11
11
=
R
T
SSSSSSSSSSS
R
T
SSSSSSSSSSS
R
T
SSSSSSSSSSS
V
X
WWWWWWWWWWW
V
X
WWWWWWWWWWW
V
X
WWWWWWWWWWW
The matrix is invertible mod p 1-  and 
solving the system yields the solutions: 
log 2 88611 = , log 3 10211 = , log 5 69411 =  
and log 7 78811 = , as one can easily verify.
For an individual logarithm, the first 
non-trivial case is h 13= , for which log 1311  
ristic because the analysis relied on un-
proven assumptions. In 1984 Coppersmith 
proposed the first (again, heuristic) ( / )L 1 3  
algorithm for the DLP in binary fields, i.e., 
in F2n [11], which generalises to arbitrary 
families of extension fields Fqn with a 
fixed base field, also referred to as small 
characteristic fields. The later develop-
ment of the number field sieve [37] and 
the function field sieve [2, 3, 27, 28] led to 
heuristic ( / )L 1 3  algorithms for all finite 
fields [20,29]. Between 1984 and 2013, no 
algorithms went below the ( / )L 1 3  barrier, 
although the far less important constant 
c was occasionally lowered for some ( , )q n  
families. It thus seemed plausible that this 
was the natural complexity of the finite 
field DLP, and cryptographers were fairly 
confident that it would not be broken any 
time soon, excepting of course the pos-
sible development of a large-scale quan-
tum computer, which threatens all DLPs as 
well as the integer factorisation problem, 
thanks to Shor’s algorithm from 1994 [48].
Each of the subexponential algorithms 
exploits the property that field elements, 
when viewed as elements in the parent 
ring, can be factored into a product of ir-
reducible elements. Thanks to this prop-
erty a very natural and broadly applicable 
framework first discussed by Kraitchik in 
the 1920s [34, 35] can be applied, namely, 
index calculus, which we now introduce.
Index calculus
The term index calculus — which literally 
means ‘calculating the index’ — originates 
from the at least two-centuries-old name 
used by Gauss for the discrete logarithm of 
an integer modulo p relative to a primitive 
root, namely, the index [17, art. 57–60]. For 
a group G written multiplicatively and a 
generator g, let h G!  be an element whose 
discrete logarithm with respect to g is to be 
computed. The index calculus method con-
sists of the following three steps.
1. Relation generation: Choose a subset 
GF 1  which we call the factor base, 
and find multiplicative relations be-
tween its elements. Observe that each 
such relation provides a linear equation 
in the logarithms of the factor base el-
ements with respect to any generator, 
modulo |G|.
2. Linear algebra: Once at least | |F  lin-
early independent equations between 
logarithms of elements of F  have been 
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produce relations for a factor base whose 
size is only polynomial in the bitlength of 
the field in question, in polynomial time, 
as the smoothness probability is expo-
nentially larger than before; indeed, such 
relations are smooth by construction. 
Since the factor base in this scenario is 
very small, usually consisting of degree 
one elements over a suitable base field, 
step 3 must now descend further which 
leads to complexities worse than ( / )L 1 3  
when using the old, or ‘classical’ tech-
niques, with the complexity being high-
est for degree two elimination. Hence, in 
order to make these insights fully appli-
cable, new descent strategies were also 
needed.
GGMZ proposed a polynomial-time 
method for eliminating degree two ele-
ments on the fly, i.e., on an element by 
element basis as required, while Joux pro-
posed a polynomial time method for com-
puting the logarithms of degree two ele-
ments in batches, as well as a technique 
to eliminate elements of very small degree, 
which leads to a heuristic ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+  al-
gorithm. The two degree two elimination 
methods led respectively to two very dif-
ferent quasi-polynomial time algorithms 
for solving the DLP in small characteristic 
extension fields, this complexity arising 
from the descent step. In particular, Joux’s 
approach led to the first such algorithm 
in mid 2013 and is due to Barbulescu, 
Gaudry, Joux and Thomé [4], while Göloğlu 
et al.’s approach led to the second in early 
2014 and is due to Granger, Kleinjung and 
Zumbrägel (referred to hereafter as GKZ), 
appearing in the preprint [22] and its fi-
nal version [23]. Since the GKZ algorithm 
is somewhat simpler and far more practical 
than the former, and is rigorously proven 
for an infinite family of extensions of every 
base field, we detail only this one in this 
article.
The GKZ algorithm
Unlike in the ( / )L 1 2  algorithms, how the 
target field is represented is now of par-
amount importance. The GKZ algorithm 
applies to fields of the form Fqkn, with 
( )logk o q18 # =  and n q.  (see Theorem 
5  for additional technical conditions). Any 
small characteristic field F 'q n can be embed-
ded into such a field by setting 'q q log n'q= _ i, 
thereby increasing the extension degree by 
a factor of logk n'q_ i. The use of such an 
embedding does not significantly affect the 
purposes assume that any such subset of 
elements has the same smoothness den-
sity as uniformly random elements of that 
norm, which is a smoothness heuristic. This 
is precisely what the ( / )L 1 3  algorithms do. 
In particular, elements of norm ( ( / ))log L 2 3  
are produced and the factor base consists 
of elements of norm ( ( / ))log L 1 3 . Applying 
Corollary 1 for the integers (or its ana-
logue for polynomials) once again means 
that the running times of steps 1 and 2 
are both ( / )L 1 3 . Since the factor base is 
now smaller, in order to obtain an ( / )L 1 3  
complexity for step 3 one needs to employ 
a descent strategy. A descent begins by ex-
pressing the target element as a product of 
elements of lower norm, mod p or mod the 
field-defining polynomial, rather than in N 
or the polynomial ring, respectively. When 
such an expression has been obtained we 
say that the element has been eliminated, 
since one need no longer compute its log-
arithm directly; only the logarithms of the 
elements in the obtained product are need-
ed. By iteratively eliminating all of the ele-
ments featured in the product one obtains 
expressions for the target element of lower 
and lower norm, until finally one has an ex-
pression over the factor base, from which 
one can easily deduce the target logarithm. 
Subject to the above smoothness heuris-
tic, techniques to do this have an ( / )L 1 3  
complexity, but with a smaller c than for 
steps 1 and 2.
The second approach — which seems 
not to have even been appreciated as a 
possibility prior to 2013, perhaps due to 
the desire to assume the above smooth-
ness heuristic for the sake of the com-
plexity analysis — is to generate relations 
between elements which have higher 
smoothness probabilities than uniformly 
random elements of the same norm. While 
no method is known for achieving this 
over the integers — and thus for the DLP 
in Fp
# — the breakthrough results from 
2013 onwards all came about because 
two ways to do this usefully for polyno-
mial rings — and thus for the DLP in small 
characteristic extension fields — were in-
dependently discovered at essentially the 
same time. The first was due to Göloğlu, 
Granger, McGuire and Zumbrägel (referred 
to hereafter as GGMZ) [18], while the sec-
ond was due to Joux [26]. Although the 
ingredients of the two methods are some-
what different, they may be viewed as be-
ing essentially isomorphic. Both methods 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .L L L2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1$b b= +b b
This complexity is minimised for /1 2b = , 
resulting in a running time of ( / , )L 1 2 2  for 
step 1. For step 2, as the matrices generat-
ed are incredibly sparse, i.e., have very few 
non-zero entries, by using either Lanczos’ al-
gorithm [36] or Wiedemann’s algorithm [52], 
the complexity is about ( / , )B L 1 2 22 b= = 
( / , )L 1 2 2  as well. Step 3 is obviously of 
lower complexity since only one relation is 
needed.
For fixed q and n " 3, one needs to 
employ a different, but equally natural no-
tion of smoothness in order to apply an 
analogous algorithm to solve the DLP in 
Fqn
#; note that the norm of an element in 
this scenario is its degree.
Definition 3. An element in [ ]xFq  of positive 
degree is said to be b-smooth if all of its 
irreducible factors are of degree at most b.
The following result on the asymptotic 
density of smooth polynomials amongst 
those of the same degree is due to Odlyz-
ko [44] and Lovorn [38].
Theorem 2. A uniformly random polynomi-
al [ ]f XFq!  of degree m is b-smooth with 
probability P u ( ( ))u o1 1= - + , where u b
m= , 
provided that m b m/ /1 100 99 100# # .
With this notion of smoothness and a 
corollary to Theorem 2 analogous to Cor-
ollary 1 but with N now qn rather than p, 
the algorithm given for Fp
#  applies to Fqn
# 
mutatis mutandis and one can show that 
it also has a running time of ( / , )L 1 2 2 . 
Note that as described above the algo-
rithm is heuristic since there is no guaran-
tee that the relations generated produce a 
linear system of full rank. However, it can 
be made rigorous by using an elementary 
argument due to Enge and Gaudry [15].
Obtaining faster algorithms
The previous analysis demonstrates that 
when elements of the field in question are 
generated uniformly at random, an ( / )L 1 2  
complexity is optimal for the index calculus 
algorithm employed. To obtain algorithms 
of better complexity, there are (at least) 
two approaches that one could attempt to 
employ.
The first approach is to generate rela-
tions between elements of smaller norm 
than before, and for complexity analysis 
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alence mod I:
( )
( ( ) ( )
( ) ( )) .
X aX bX c
h X
Xh X ah X
bXh X ch X
1
q q1
1
0 0
1 1
/
+ + +
+
+ +
+
(3)
Denote the left-hand side and the nu-
merator of the right-hand side of (3) by 
( )L X  and ( )R X , respectively. The condition 
( )Q R X1 ;  can be expressed as 
, ,b u a v c u a v0 0 1 1= + = + (4)
for some ,u v Fi i qkd!  (at least in general; 
some degenerate cases are easily obviat-
ed, see [23, Section 3.1]). Note that since 
d 2h # , the cofactor of Q1 in ( )R X  has de-
gree at most one and so no smoothness 
heuristics are required as long as ( )L X  
splits completely over Fqkd. Crucially, al-
though the degree of ( )L X  is q 1+ , such 
polynomials split completely over Fqkd with 
probability /q1 3. , which is exponentially 
larger than the /( )!q1 1+  one expects for 
uniformly random polynomials of this de-
gree. Indeed, for kd 3$  if ab c!  and b aq! , 
( )L X  may be transformed (up to a scalar) 
into
( ) ,
( )
( )
,
F X X BX B
B
c ab
b a
with
B
q
q
q q
1
1
= + +
=
-
-
+
+ (5)
via X X ab a
c ab
q= --
- . ( )L X  splits whenever 
FB splits and the transformation from X  
to X is valid. The following theorem is due 
to Bluher [6].
Theorem 3. The number of elements B Fqkd!
#  
such that the polynomial ( ) [ ]F X XFB qkd!  
splits completely over Fqkd  equals 
if is odd
if is even
,
q
q
kd
q
q q
kd
1
1
1
.
kd
kd
2
1
2
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
In both cases the number of such B is 
qkd 3. - . Let B be the set of all B Fqkd!
#  
such that FB splits completely over Fqkd. 
Since for any B B!  one can freely choose 
a and any b aq! , while the expression 
for B in (5) determines c uniquely, there 
are q kd3 3. -  such ( )L X  which split com-
pletely over Fqkd, which explains the /q1
3 
splitting probability. One way to intuit why 
this number is so large is that the sub-
set of polynomials of the form ( )L X  which 
split completely over Fqkd may be seen to 
arise from taking the homogeneous eval-
The descent
First note that any element in Fqkn
#  can be 
lifted to an irreducible element of degree 
2 e in [ ]XFqk , provided that n2 4>
e , thanks 
to a Dirichlet-type theorem due to Wan [51, 
Theorem 5.1], so one applies this to each 
featured g hi ia b  before descending to the 
factor base. Second, we claim the follow-
ing.
Proposition 1. Let [ ]Q XFqk!  be an irreduc-
ible polynomial of degree d2 2$ . Then Q 
can be expressed mod I as a product of at 
most q 2+  irreducible polynomials of de-
gree dividing d, in time ( , )poly q d .
To see that this implies a quasi-poly-
nomial time algorithm, observe that if Q 
is irreducible of degree 2 e, then one ap-
plication of Proposition 1 leads to at 
most q 2+  irreducibles of degree divid-
ing 2e 1- . Applying it to each of these 
leads to at most ( )q 2 2+  irreducibles of 
degree dividing 2e 2- . Recursively lowering 
the degrees in this way eventually leads 
to at most ( )q 2 e+  degree one polynomials 
and takes time at most ( ) ( )polyq q2 e+ = 
( ) ( )polyq q2 log n2+  to compute, as d is at 
most n q2e 1 . .- . The running time for 
the algorithm is therefore q ( )log n O k2 + , which 
is quasi-polynomial in q kn as claimed.
We now show that in order to prove 
Proposition 1 it is sufficient for there to 
be an efficient elimination method for irre-
ducible degree two polynomials in [ ]XFqkd , 
expressing each as a product of at most 
q 2+  linear polynomials mod I. Let Q be as 
in Proposition 1. Observe that over the de-
gree d extension Fqkd the polynomial Q fac-
tors into d irreducible quadratics Q Qd1 $ $g . 
Applying the hypothesised degree two 
elimination method to any one of these 
quadratics — say Q1 — expresses it as a 
product of at most q 2+  linear polynomials 
over Fqkd mod I. Then applying the norm 
map with respect to the extension /F Fq qkd k 
to both sides of the expression maps Q1 
back to Q and the linear polynomials to 
powers of irreducible polynomials of de-
gree dividing d (the degree depending on 
the base field of the respective constant 
terms), which thus eliminates Q as per the 
proposition.
We now describe such a degree two 
elimination method which first featured 
in [18]. Let [ ]Q XFq1 kd!  be an irreducible 
quadratic to be eliminated mod I. For 
, ,a b c Fqkd!  consider the following equiv-
algorithm’s resulting complexity. The field 
setup used in [23] can be either from [18] 
(with a small modification from [21]), or 
from [26], both of which may be seen in 
the context of the Joux–Lercier doubly-ra-
tional function field sieve variant [28].
Let , [ ]h h XFq0 1 k!  be coprime and of de-
gree d 2h # , such that ( ) ( )h X X h X 0
q
1 0 /-  
( )mod I  for an irreducible degree n poly-
nomial [ ]I XFqk! . Heuristically, such ,h h0 1 
can always be found. Let x be a root of I 
in Fqkn, so that ( )xF Fq qkn k= . Observe that 
by the choice of field-defining polynomi-
al we have ( )/ ( )x h x h xq 0 1= . The factor 
base is:
{ [ ] ( ) } { ( )} .degf X f h x1FF q 1k ,! #=
Let g Fqkn!
# , let h g!G H, let h gt=  with the 
integer t to be computed and let N q 1kn= -  
be the order of the multiplicative group 
of Fqkn. Thanks to a small adaptation of 
the argument given by Diem [12], which is 
an adaptation of that given by Enge and 
Gaudry [15], one does not need to compute 
the logarithms of the factor base elements, 
as we now sketch. Let | |F F=  and let the 
elements of F  be , ,f fF1 f . One constructs 
a matrix ( ) ( / )R r NZ Z,
( )
i j
F F1!= #+  and 
column vectors , ( / )NZ Z F 1!a b +  as fol-
lows. For each i with i F1 1# # +  choose 
, /NZ Zi i !a b  uniformly and independent-
ly at random and apply the to-be-explained 
randomised descent algorithm to g hi ia b  to 
express this as
( ) .modg h f Ij
r
j
F
1
,i i i j/a b
=
% (2)
One then computes a lower row echelon 
form R’ of R by using invertible row trans-
formations and applies these row transfor-
mations to a and b, resulting in vectors a’ 
and b’ respectively. Since the first row of R’ 
vanishes, we have '' h 1=g 1 1a b  and hence 
' ( )modN0/' tb+ .1 1a  If ' , )N 1=(gcd 1b  then 
one can invert '1b to compute t. One can 
prove that '1b is uniformly distributed in 
/NZ Z (cf. [23, Lemma 2.1]) and so the 
algorithm succeeds with (the very high) 
probability ( )/N Nz ; if it does not then 
one simply repeats the algorithm until it 
is successful.
We therefore need only describe the de-
scent procedure for carrying out (2), which 
need only be applied F 1+  times, i.e., a 
polynomial number of times. This depends 
on the recursive application of degree two 
elimination, as we now explain.
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Computational records and impact
Since early 2013 several computation-
al records have been set using the tech-
niques from [18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 30], which 
have dwarfed previous records, demon-
strating categorically their superiority. 
Moreover, such large scale computations 
also help to inform one of potential pitfalls 
(cf. the traps noted in [21, Remark 1]), and 
can also lead to theoretical insights that 
give rise to novel or improved algorithms. 
In practice, since the running time is 
dominated by the descent one first com-
putes the logarithms of the factor base el-
ements (cf. [18, Section 3] and [26, Section 
4.2]), so that only one descent is needed. 
A descent usually consists of: several clas-
sical elimination steps; the GKZ elimina-
tion for irreducibles of small even degree 
(for which kd 4$  suffices in practice) and 
Joux’s elimination method for irreducibles 
of small odd degree [26]; and finally de-
gree two elimination, either from GGMZ or 
[26]. The crossover points between these 
techniques should be determined using 
a dynamic programming bottom-up ap-
proach [21].
Table 1 contains a selection of discrete 
logarithm computations in finite fields. All 
details may be found in [10]. At the time 
Theorem 5. Given a prime power q 61>  
that is not a power of 4, an integer k 18$ , 
coprime polynomials , [ ]h h XFq0 1 k!  of de-
gree at most two and an irreducible de-
gree n factor I of h X hq1 0- , the DLP in 
[ ]/( )X IF Fq qkn k,  can be solved in expect-
ed time
 
.q ( )log n O k2 +
Thanks to Kummer theory, such ,h h1 0 are 
known to exist when n q 1= - , which gives 
the following easy corollary when m = 
( )ik p 1i -  [23,Theorem 1.1].
Theorem 6. For every prime p there exist 
infinitely many explicit extension fields Fpm 
in which the DLP can be solved in expected 
quasi-polynomial time
( / ( ))( ) .exp log logo m1 2 1 2+_ i
One may also replace the prime p in 
Theorem 6 by a (fixed) prime power pr by 
setting k r18= . Proving the existence of 
,h h0 1 for general extension degrees as per 
Theorem 5 seems to be a hard problem, 
even though in practice it is very easy to 
find such polynomials and heuristically is 
almost certain.
uation of Möbius transformations of X in 
( )X X Xq
Fq
a- = -
!a
% . In particular, for 
, , ,' ' ' 'a b c d Fqkd!  with ' ' ' 'a d b c 0!-  one has
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ,
' ' ' '
' '
' '
' '
' ' ' '
' ' ' '
' '
' ' ' '
c X d c X d
a X b
c X d
a X b
a X b c X d
a X b c X d
c X d
a X b c X d
q
q
q
q
1
Fq
# a
+ +
+ - +
+
= + +
- + +
= +
+ - +
!a
+
^
cb l
h
m
%
(7)
(6)
where (6) is of the same form as ( )L X  (up 
to a scalar) and (7) is a product of linear 
polynomials. Indeed, this is precisely how 
Joux approached obtaining such ( )L X  [26, 
Section 4.2]. Joux also showed that the 
number of such polynomials is
| ( ) | / | ( ) |
( )/( ) ,
PGL PGL
q q q q q
F Fq q
kd kd kd
2 2
3 3 3 3
kd
.= - - -
broadly matching the number arising from 
the approach already described.
The following theorem due to Helleseth 
and Kholosha [24, Theroem 5] (generalised 
to arbitrary characteristic) characterises the 
set B.
Theorem 4.
( )
( )
\ .
z z
z z
z F FB
q q
q q
q q1
1
kd2
2
2!=
-
-
+
+* 4
Combining Theorem 4 with the expres-
sion for B in (5) and the expressions for b 
and c in (4), to eliminate Q1 one needs to 
find an ( , ) \A Z F F Fq q qkd kd 2#! _ i satisfying
/ :
( ) ( ( ) )
( ) ( ) .
C
Z Z u A v u A v
Z Z A u Au 0
Fq
q q q
q q q q
1
1
2
1 0 0
1
0 1
1
kd
2
2
- - + - +
- - - + + =
+
+ +
That there are sufficiently many points on 
C was proven in [23] by analysing the ac-
tion of ( )PGL Fq2  on Z in order to prove 
that there is an absolutely irreducible factor 
of C, and then applying the Weil bound. 
One also needs to consider so-called de-
scent traps, which are elements that divide 
( ) ( )h X X h Xq1 0
kd 1
-
+
 for d 0$  which can not 
be eliminated in the above manner and so 
must be avoided during the descent. Com-
puting points on C is efficient since one 
can take any \Z F Fq qkd 2!  which gives a 
polynomial in A, whose Fqkd roots can be 
computed by taking the greatest common 
denominator with A Aq
kd
- , for instance, 
which takes time polynomial in log qkn. The 
above algorithm and considerations lead to 
the following [23, Theorem 1.2].
Bitlength Charact. Kummer Who and when Complexity
127 2 no Coppersmith, 1984 ( / , [ . , . ])L 1 3 1 526 1 587
401 2 no Gordon and McCurley, 1992 ( / , [ . , . ])L 1 3 1 526 1 587
521 2 no Joux and Lercier, 2001 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 526
607 2 no Thomé, 2002 ( / , [ . , . ])L 1 3 1 526 1 587
613 2 no Joux and Lercier, 2005 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 526
556 medium yes Joux and Lercier, 2006 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 442
676 3 no Hayashi et al., 2010 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 442
923 3 no Hayashi et al., 2012 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 442
1175 medium yes Joux, 24 December 2012 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 260
1425 medium yes Joux, 6 January 2013 ( / , . )L 1 3 1 260
1778 2 yes Joux, 11 February 2013 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
1971 2 yes GGMZ, 19 February 2013 ( / , . )L 1 3 0 763
4080 2 yes Joux, 22 March 2013 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
6120 2 yes GGMZ, 11 April 2013 ( / )L 1 4
6168 2 yes Joux, 21 May 2013 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
1303 3 no AMOR, 27 January 2014 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
4404 2 no GKZ, 30 January 2014 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
9234 2 yes GKZ, 31 January 2014 ( / ( ))L o1 4 1+
3796 3 no Joux and Pierrot, 15 September 2014 ([ ( ), / ( )])L o o1 1 4 1+
1279 2 no Kleinjung, 17 October 2014 ([ ( ), / ( )])L o o1 1 4 1+
4841 3 no Adj et al., 18 July 2016 ([ ( ), / ( )])L o o1 1 4 1+
Table 1  A selection of discrete logarithm computations in finite fields.
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general. Whether the prime field DLP or the 
integer factorisation problem will remain 
hard remains to be seen: the current re-
cord bitlength for both of these problems is 
768, which took 5300.  [32] and 1700.  [31] 
core years, respectively. However, the ideas 
behind the breakthroughs do not seem to 
be extendable to these scenarios since 
there is no analogue of the tremendously 
useful polynomial X Xq -  around which one 
can build such an algorithm. s
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making them ideal for setting records. 
Since parameters would have to increase 
significantly to counter the quasi-polynomi-
al time algorithms, thus making the crypto-
systems inefficient, and since further algo-
rithmic developments in this area should 
be expected, small characteristic supersin-
gular curves (or those with low embedding 
degree) should be considered completely 
insecure for pairing-based cryptography.
In summary, we see that long-studied 
so-called hard problems can suddenly 
become easy with the right ideas, while 
basing cryptography on unproven compu-
tational assumptions is inherently risky in 
of writing the largest example DLP to have 
been solved was in the field of 29234 ele-
ments, which took 45.  core years of com-
putation. The impact on cryptography can 
be seen from the solution of DLPs in the 
fields of bitlength 4404 and 4841, which 
both arise from what were designed to be 
industry-standard 128-bit secure supersin-
gular curves. These took 5.  and 200.  
core years, respectively. Note that these 
fields can not be represented by a Kummer 
extension; fields which admit such a repre-
sentation make the computation much eas-
ier due to the presence of factor base auto-
morphisms and other descent advantages, 
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